In “Plans for a post-American NATO”, Phillips P. O’Brien and Edward Stringer attempt to address the security vacuum they foresee as a result of a second Trump administration. In particular, they highlight my proposal for a “dormant NATO,” in which I outline an organizational framework in which the United States would remove its ground forces from Europe to shift the burden of defending the continent from Washington to the region’s own governments . According to O’Brien and Stringer, a dormant NATO could quickly become a dead NATO, as the alliance would struggle to survive unless the United States clearly demonstrates an overwhelming commitment to Europe. Without that commitment, the authors argue, older divisions will return, with Central and Eastern Europe becoming more aggressive, while Northern and Western Europe continue to free-ride on Washington. “A European security alliance,” they write, “could collapse under the weight of such incompatible visions.”
O’Brien and Stringer are wrong in their assessment of my proposal. A dormant NATO is not a devastating withdrawal from Europe. Instead, it is based on three correct assumptions: that structural forces will push the United States to prioritize Asia over Europe, that NATO’s continued expansion will dilute NATO’s core geographic interests and transform a defensive alliance into an ideological alliance, and that Western European free trade agreements will be converted into an allied alliance. horse riding is the result of an overwhelming American presence. Under my system, the United States would still hold back the continent’s security by providing a nuclear umbrella and deploying its naval assets. The proposal never calls for total cuts. What it does call for is a better and fairer division of labor, with Washington shifting the burdens of logistics, armor and infantry to prosperous Western European powers.
But more importantly, O’Brien and Stringer are wrong about European security in general. The authors argue that NATO could survive a US withdrawal if it reshuffles its leadership and unifies. In particular, they argue that the continent should transfer NATO’s military command to an Eastern European state, such as Poland, and develop a joint nuclear deterrent. But their proposals ignore the central puzzle they explicitly present to themselves: Europe’s strategic incoherence. They fail to accept that the continent’s “incompatible prospects” are not the product of bad design, but the result of geography, culture, threat perceptions, offensive capabilities, industrial power and a host of other variables. Such differences are irreconcilable. Without Washington, there cannot be a coherent European security alliance, because a united Europe does not exist and has never existed.
Instead, Europe is an artificial entity, an entity made up of states with very different interests. For example, it is only sensible that Germany and the Netherlands invest less in helping Ukraine than Estonia or Poland, because the defense priorities of each of these states depend on their geographical distance from Russia – and the former two countries are much further away than the others to land. latter. The shared European security architecture, on the other hand, is unnatural. It is supported by American hegemony, which has pushed Europe’s traditional great powers to spend less on their militaries than they otherwise would, and discouraged traditional nationalist violence on the continent. It is therefore absurd to imagine a European unity without the United States – as the authors try to do.
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS
O’Brien and Stringer try to tackle in a practical way the difficult security problems that Europe would face if Washington were to abandon it. They weigh the resources and ideologies of the continent’s largest states to determine which could be the best leader. Ultimately, they conclude that France, Germany and Britain are all incapable of leading the continent – but that Poland could be, given the country’s recent rearmament. They also argue that Europe should consider introducing a continent-wide nuclear deterrent. In the short term, they propose that London and Paris could provide such a shield by giving other European states some power over their launch protocols. In the long term, they argue that the continent must create a jointly owned nuclear arsenal.
These ideas may make for good academic discussion, but they are unrealistic. Consider the nuclear issue first. The idea that France or the United Kingdom would allow another state – let alone an unelected bureaucrat in the European Union – to dictate their nuclear positions is fanciful. That includes the idea that European countries would work together to develop a shared nuclear arsenal.
In connection with this, the authors’ claim that France, Germany and Britain will agree to a common foreign policy path defies logic: the great power peace in Europe is due to an overwhelming Pax Americana, not because the countries have suddenly become benevolent. Even if Europe’s major powers are now inherently more peaceful, it is unlikely that the continent’s three most populous states would abandon their competing strategic and economic interests and agree to be led by a hawkish and paranoid Eastern European country which is much less powerful, financially or economically. materially than anyone else.
O’Brien and Stringer thus seem to misunderstand European history. For more than seventy years, NATO’s task has not only been to defend Europe. It has also aimed to temper the European national outbursts that helped spark two world wars, in part by making it impossible for any country to dominate others. The only plausible way for Europe to achieve what the authors outline is by turning the European Union into a supranational empire, with all the repression that creating such an entity entails. By centralizing Europe from a federalized trading bloc to a formal imperial state, policymakers would naturally encourage and nurture centrifugal social forces. These forces would in turn trigger a cycle of political and economic repression and erode democratic rights – as has happened in the past.
THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS
Fortunately, there is a moderate option for a new European strategic architecture, one that avoids a total US withdrawal but does not push Washington to the point of insolvency. Rather than trying to provide security to a continent that is largely at peace and rich enough to finance its own defense, the United States can act as an offshore balancer. Washington will no longer strive for primacy on the European stage. Instead, it will enable European rearmament and then European burden-sharing. It will remove soldiers and equipment from Europe and allow Western European states to return to pre-1990 military forces. But the United States will continue to provide an overarching nuclear umbrella for NATO members and will continue to discourage proliferation on the continent, a core US objective for more than half a century. The formidable Second Fleet would protect sea lanes, support the continent’s major naval powers and continue to provide extended deterrence – to appease Europeans fearful of abandonment at a time of Russian revanchism.
This approach, unlike that of O’Brien and Stringer, is rooted in reality. It recognizes that not all states will face similar threats, and that if a distant hegemon provides total security, the likelihood of free-riding increases among states far removed from their main rival power. Furthermore, the larger an alliance, the more equal all states become, regardless of their size and contribution, reducing the relative power of the hegemonic protector. None of these forces are beneficial to Washington.
A sleeping NATO tackles these dilemmas. It keeps the United States tethered to the continent, controls nuclear proliferation, and keeps nationalist and imperialist impulses among European powers in check. It curbs populism on both sides of the Atlantic with fairer defense spending and provides security to European states that for historical reasons cannot trust their fellow European powers. But it still forces Western Europe to do more to protect the continent than the region is doing now. The simple fact is that France, Germany and other Western European states will never seriously invest in their military until they can no longer freely leave the United States for protection. They need Washington to partially withdraw before they can better coordinate with Central and Eastern Europe.
The Europeans will certainly grumble about a partial American cutback. But ultimately, a dormant NATO would benefit all members. If Europe better shares the burdens of logistics, armor, intelligence, and infantry, the United States will have an easier time guaranteeing European peace and unity with its predominant nuclear and maritime power. And NATO would ultimately become closed, minimalist and defensive – as its founders originally intended.
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